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Abstract: 
One of the key principles of law allowing for the development and consequent enforcement of EU law in 
the past decades is the right to an effective judicial remedy. This working paper summarises its effects, 
outlines its main sources, its scope of protection, its limits and some future challenges to its application 
within the EU’s complex system of implementation of EU law. The special difficulties for a system of 
remedies arises from the parallel existence of implementation of EU law by Member States bodies mostly 
undertaken in horizontal cooperation with other Member States and vertically with EU institutions 
bodies and agencies. This cooperation is often highly proceduralised which makes it challenging to identify 
responsibilities and thus allocate remedies.    
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that in the absence of 
judicial remedies on the Union level, it is for the Member States to establish a sufficiently 
complete ‘system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to 
effective judicial protection’ of Union law.1 One of the key principles in the context of 
the protection of rights against public actors has been the right to an effective judicial 
remedy.2 The latter is not only a General Principle of EU law, requiring that rights arising 
from EU law, be ‘effectively protected in each case’,3 it is also explicitly recognised in 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR) as the right to an 
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1 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 40, 41; Case C97/91 Oleificio Borelli 
[1992] ECR I-6313, para 15. 
2 The Court of Justice has repeatedly found this right to be a fundamental right of individuals resulting from the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States and recognised Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, applicable as 
sources of General Principles of EU law under Article 6(3) TEU. See e.g.: Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, 
paras 18 and 19; Case 222/86 Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, para 14; Case C-424/99 Commission v Austria [2001] 
ECR I-9285, para 45; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para 39; Case C-
467/01 Eribrand [2003] ECR I-6471, para 61; Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para 37; Joined Cases C-
402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351, para 335; Case 12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR 
I-6653, para 47; Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 Alassini [2010] ECR I-2213, para 61.  
3 Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, para 17; Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, para 18. Understood in that 
sense, Article 47 CFR requires a broad interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR. However, the right to an effective judicial 
remedy is also, next to its recognition under Article 47 CFR recognised as General Principle of EU law (Article 6(3) 
TEU), the application of which to Member States is limited by the case law and is not subject to Article 51 CFR. 
‘effective remedy before a tribunal’. Member States are bound by it when implementing 
EU law and when acting within its scope.4 Accordingly, Member States are obliged to 
ensure that their courts provide ‘direct and immediate protection’ of rights arising from 
the Union legal order,5 and national procedural and substantive rules which have an 
actual or potential effect on the existence, degree and enforceability of remedies to 
enforce rights arising from EU law comply with EU law requirements.6 In short, the 
CJEU requires that where there is a right under Union law, Member States should offer a 
remedy to ensure its enforcement (ubi ius ibi remedium) ‘both in law and in practice.’7 
 
Implementation of EU law, however, is less clearly structured according to Member State 
or EU-levels. In fact, although organisationally separate, actors from different levels 
often conduct procedures in close cooperation making the protection of rights arising 
under EU law in this context is an ever more challenging task. The aim of this paper is to 
explore in this context, whether and how the right to an effective judicial remedy, which 
has had a profound influence on the development of the EU-specific system of remedies, 
needs to be adaptation to the changing conditions of implementation of EU law marked 
by an ever closer cooperation of the executive branches of power on the EU level and 
the levels of the Member States. In order to do so, this paper adopts a classic legal 
approach by exploring first the scope of protection offered to individuals by the right to 
an effective remedy in the different constellations of a final act implementing EU being 
issued by an institution body or agency of the EU or of the Member States as well as in 
the context of disputes between individuals. The paper then looks at accepted limitations 
of the right before deducting from this screening exercise where problems of effective 
judicial protection can be located in today’s system of implementation of EU law in 
relation to the reality of highly integrated implementation procedures. 
                                                 
4 See Article 51(1) CFR and the interpreting cases, especially C-617/10 Akerberg [2013] ECR I-nyr of 26. February 
2013, paras. 19-21. With respect to the notion of the principle of the right to an effective judicial remedy as General 
Principle of EU law protected under Article 6(3) TEU, Case C-260/89, ERT-AE v DEP [1991] ECR I-2925, paras 41-
43. The right to an effective judicial remedy therefore also protects the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU 
law (Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, paras 10. 12, 13; 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 1141; Case 106/77 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para. 17), in as it requires that ‘everyone whose 
rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the law of the Union’, be given the possibility to obtain a ‘remedy to set aside 
national measures which are in conflict therewith.’ (W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 
CMLRev. (2000) 501–36, at p. 509; Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paras. 18-21). 
5 Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 453 at page 463. 
6 AG Trstenjak offered an extensive interpretation of this expression in her Opinion in Case C-411/10 N.S. [2011] 
ECR-nyr, paras 149-177, also including infringements of the Geneva Convention and the ECHR. 
7 Application no 30210/96 Kudla v Poland [GC] §157, ECHR 2000-XI. Article 13 ECHR is, however, more limited than 
the right to an effective judicial review under EU law. Article 13 ECHR protects only rights arising from the 
Convention – therefore only fundamental rights and freedoms. The General Principle of EU law, by contrast, protects 
all rights arising from EU law in both a vertical and a horizontal level. For further explanation see below in this 
commentary.  
The Scope of Protection of the Right to an Effective Remedy 
 
Identifying the scope of protection of the right to an effective judicial remedy in the 
system of multiple sources of the Union has not become more easy with the explicit 
recognition of the General Principle of EU law in Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union (CFR). First, any right listed therein must be 
interpreted and exercised ‘under the conditions and within the limits’ defined by relevant 
Treaty provisions which make provision for it (Article 52(2) CFR). In this sense, the right 
to an ‘effective remedy before a tribunal’ is interpreted in the context of Article 19(1) 
TEU which establishes that national judges are judges of Union law in that Member 
States ‘shall provide the remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
fields covered by Union law’ - a specification of the general obligation under the 
principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) obliging Member States to ‘take any 
appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising’ 
from EU law. The Court of Justice (CJ) has repeatedly held that the principle of sincere 
cooperation includes the obligation of judicial enforcement of EU law before national 
Courts.8 Article 47 CFR in this sense states the previously obvious fact individuals have 
the right to enforce the obligation of the Member States under Articles 4(3) and 19 TEU 
to grant an effective judicial review. Secondly, under Article 52(3) CFR, the right to an 
effective judicial remedy also needs to be interpreted to at least the same level as relevant 
rights under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) as interpreted by the Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg (ECtHR). In fact, Union Courts, ever since recognising the right to an 
effective judicial remedy as General Principle of EU law, have referred to its origins inter 
alia from Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.9 In the case law of the ECtHR, Article 6 is 
                                                 
8 See to the relation between the principle of sincere cooperation and the right to an effective judicial remedy e.g.: Case 
33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, para 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para 12; Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] 
ECR 629, paras 21 and 22; Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, para 19; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck 
[1995] ECR I-4599, para 12; Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para 38: ‘Under the principle of cooperation 
laid down in Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU], it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an 
individual’s rights under Community law’.  The Court regularly recites the formulation according to which ‘it is settled 
case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the matter it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules 
governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such 
rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and do not 
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the principle of 
effectiveness).’ See: Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-14447, para 45 with reference also to Case C-120/97 Upjohn 
[1999] ECR I-223, para 32. 
9 M. Poelemans, La sanction dans l’ordre juridique communautaire Bruylant (Bruxelles, 2004), 621. See e.g.: Case 222/84 
Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paras 18 and 19; Case 222/86 Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, para 14; Case C-424/99 
Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, para 45; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-
regarded as lex specialis to Article 13 ECHR in that the requirements of Article 13 are 
‘absorbed by more stringent requirements of Article 6’ ECHR.10 The effect of Article 13 
ECHR is ‘to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with … an “arguable 
complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief.’11 The formulation of 
Article 13 ECHR is more limited than that of Article 47 CFR in that grants the right to 
an effective remedy only before national courts. In any case, the right to an effective 
judicial remedy must at least offer the level of protection which Articles 6 and 13 ECHR 
would have guaranteed.  Finally, Article 52(4) CFR also requires interpretation of Article 
47 in light of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States.12  
 
In this context, the CJEU has ruled that effective judicial protection must be offered by 
courts and tribunals recognised as such by EU law both on the EU-level and by national 
courts.13 The notion of independence and impartiality requires that a tribunal be impartial 
and be competent to rule on both facts and law.14 These conditions are well illustrated by 
the case Wilson, in which the Court found a breach of the right to an effective judicial 
review. In order to implement an EU directive allowing lawyers to practise under certain 
conditions in another Member State, Luxembourg had designated bodies linked to the 
local bar association to take the initial decisions. The Court found that such bodies were 
not impartial under the conditions of the right to an effective judicial remedy. A body is 
impartial, only when it is ‘protected against external intervention or pressure liable to 
jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before 
                                                                                                                                            
6677, para 39; Case C-467/01 Eribrand [2003] ECR I-6471, para 61; Case 12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR I-6653, 
para 47; Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 Alassini [2010] ECR I-2213, para 61. 
10 See e.g. Application 31556/03 Efendiyeva v Azerbaijan §59, ECHR 2007; 31720/02 Titarenko v Ukraine §80, ECHR 
2012. 
11 Application 63235/00 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v Finland [GC] §80, ECHR 2007. 
12 The right to an effective remedy is recognised under national law. To name just one 
example, Article 19(4) of the German Basic Law (Federal Constitution) requires to grant 
judicial the possibility of judicial review against claimed violations of rights committed by 
public institutions bodies and other forms of public action. 
13 The relevant definition of a national court or tribunal under the Union right to an effective judicial remedy is the 
same as has been laid down by the Court in the definition of bodies entitled to make a preliminary reference under 
Article 267 TFEU. See: C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 48 with reference (by analogy) to Joined Cases C-
238/99 P, C-244-245/99P, C-250/99P, C-252/99P, C-254/99P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappijand and Others [2002] ECR 
I-8375, paras 180-205, 223, 234. A tribunal, by analogy to the case law under Article 267 TFEU, is thus to be assessed 
in the sense of Article 47 CFR by taking into account factors such as ‘whether the body is established by law, 
whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it 
applies rules of law’ (Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, para 23; Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-
147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, para 33; Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445 para. 10; C-
506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 48 – each with further references) and its independence and impartiality 
(Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò [1987] ECR 2545, para 7; Case 338/85 Pardini [1988] ECR 2041, para 9). 
14 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, paras 60-62. 
them.’15 Additionally, there have to be guarantees ‘sufficient to protect the person of 
those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute, such as guarantees against removal 
from office’.16 Impartiality further requires that judges act with a degree of objectivity 
which requires ‘the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from 
the strict application of the rule of law do not have any specific interest in the outcome 
of the procedure’.17  
 
Applying these conditions of review to acts adopted to implement EU law has led to 
groups of cases I would summarise under three different sub-categories: Disputes about 
acts adopted by EU institutions bodies and agencies; disputes about implementing acts 
by Member States; and finally disputes arising between individuals in which EU law or 
rights resulting from EU law might be decisive for the outcome of the dispute. 
 
A EU-level implementation 
 
Where legal protection is required on the EU level, the CJ has rather apodictically stated 
that the Treaties have ‘created a complete system of legal remedies’.18 As restated in 
Article 19 TEU these include both direct challenges before EU courts and indirect 
challenges before national courts. However, according to strict interpretation of standing 
rights by the CJEU,  
 
‘the Courts of the European Union may not, without exceeding their jurisdiction, 
interpret the conditions under which an individual may institute proceedings 
against a regulation in a way which has the effect of setting aside those 
conditions, expressly laid down in the Treaty, even in the light of the principle of 
effective judicial protection.’19 
                                                 
15 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 51 with reference to Case C-103/97 Köllensperger and Atzwanger [1999] 
ECR I-551, para 21; C-407/98 Abrahamsson and Anderson [2000] ECR I-5539, para 36; See also the ECtHR interpreting 
the requirements of Article 6 ECHR in Application no. 7819/77; 7878/77 Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, § 78 
ECHR 1984, Series A No 80. 
16 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 51 with reference to Joined Cases C-9/97 and C-118/97 Jokela 
andPitkäranta [1998] ECR I-6267, para 20. 
17 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 52. 
18 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para 40; Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré [2004] 
ECR I-3425, para 30; Case C-167/02 P Rothley [2004] ECR I-3149, para 46; C-461/03 Gaston Schul [2005] ECR I-10513, 
para 22. 
19 Order of the General Court in Case T-18/10 Inuit [2011] ECR II-nyr, para 51. The tone of these statements appears 
to be remarkably different from the broadening notion to judicial review and standing – where necessary in expansion 
of the existing wording of the Treaty – in Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339, para 23 on the basis of the rule of 
law. 
 From this follows that in view of the CJEU the right to an effective remedy does not 
require an extension of the existing forms of action listed in the Treaties – to the contrary 
of what the plaintiffs in UPA, Jégo Quéré and Inuit had pleaded.20 This stance taken by the 
CJEU had left a certain degree of danger of remaining gaps in protection.  
 
The Courts’ formulaic repetition of the notion of a ‘complete system of judicial 
protection’ non withstanding, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced an amendment to the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU under which individual persons can bring actions 
for annulment of ‘regulatory acts’ which are of direct effect and for which no further 
implementing acts are required. AG Kokott in her Opinion in Inuit,21 in view of resisting 
dangers of gaps in legal protection, suggested to fill these gaps essentially by introducing 
a declaratory action in the following form: The first would concern cases where 
individuals seek review of an EU act of legislative nature of direct effect which did not 
require further implementing acts by the Member States. It would be in violation of the 
right to an effective judicial review, if a natural person would first have to violate such 
law in order to be able to invoke indirectly its illegality in defence against a penalty for 
violation of that act.22 In order to remedy that situation, where it is for Member States 
bodies to enforce the law, Kokott therefore suggests creating - under EU law - an 
obligation by national authorities to provide for a reasoned answer to an individual’s 
request for clarification of rights and obligations arising from EU law. Such answer 
would then need to be understood by national courts as a decision against which 
standing under national law would need to be granted. An individual might, in case of a 
preliminary reference before the CJEU then also incidentally claim under Article 277 
TFEU the illegality of the legislative act. Where it is, on the other hand, for Union bodies 
to enforce EU law, AG Kokott suggests that the right to good administration, a General 
Principle of EU law which is also protected under Article 41 CFR, should oblige the 
Union bodies to provide for an answer as to the applicability of a legal obligation directly 
arising under an EU legislative act. In order to avoid a gap in the legal protection of 
individuals, in potential violation of the right to an effective judicial remedy under Article 
47 CFR, such answer, she claims, would need to be interpreted as decision under Article 
288 TFEU against which standing under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU 
                                                 
20 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 37-40; Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré [2004] 
ECR I-3425, paras 29, 30, 36; Order of the General Court in Case T-18/10 Inuit [2011] ECR II-nyr, paras 50-52. 
21 See paras 115-122 of the Opinion of AG Kokott of 17 January 2013 in Case C-583/11 P Inuit [2013] ECR I-nyr. 
22 Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425, paras 29, 30, 36. 
should be granted by the CJEU. Whether the Court will follow in future cases these calls 
for addressing potential gaps in the right to an effective judicial remedy voiced by one of 
its AGs remains to be seen.    
 
This discussion is applicable to claims brought by individuals as well as those brought by 
associations. The case law on competition law including state aid control has been 
especially relevant in illustrating these concepts. Associations representing claimants 
interests are 
  
‘as a rule, entitled to bring an action for annulment against a final decision of the 
Commission in matters of State aid only if the undertakings which it represents 
or some of those undertakings themselves have locus standi or if it can prove an 
interest of its own.’23 
 
This the Court in Territorio Histórico de Álava explained, serves reasons of economies of 
scale since  
 
‘the adoption of a broad interpretation of the right of associations to intervene is 
intended to facilitate assessment of the context of such cases whilst avoiding 
multiple individual interventions which would compromise the effectiveness and 
proper course of the procedure’.24 
  
In ARE on the other hand, an association of small businesses and former land owners, 
despite having had actively participated in a formal investigation, could not show to be 
individually concerned due to the competitive situation they were in. The Court found 
that a very large amount of competitors, in fact, ‘all farmers in the EU’ could be regarded 
as competitors of the beneficiaries of the land acquisition scheme’ applied under German 
law.25 Similarly, in Italy and Sardegna v Commission, the Court held, that a company could 
not contest ‘a Commission decision prohibiting a sectoral aid scheme if it is concerned 
                                                 
23 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission [2006] ECR I-5479, para 56: “An 
association such as Forum 187 which is responsible for protecting the collective interests of coordination centres 
established in Belgium is, as a rule, entitled to bring an action for annulment against a final decision of the Commission 
in matters of State aid only if the undertakings which it represents or some of those undertakings themselves have 
locus standi (Case C-6/92 Federmineraria [1993] ECR I-6357, paragraphs 15 and 16) or if it can prove an interest of its 
own (Case C-313/90 CIRFS [1993] ECR I-1125, paragraphs 29 and 30).” 
24 Joined Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio histórico de Álava and Others v. 
Commission [2009] nyr, para. 84 with reference, inter alia, to the Order of the General Court in Case T-201/04 R Microsoft 
v Commission [2004] ECR II-2977, para. 38. 
25 C-78/03 P Commission v. ARE [2005] ECR I-10737, para. 72. 
by that decision solely by virtue of belonging to the sector in question and being a 
potential beneficiary of the scheme.’26  
 
Also the pre-conditions for litigation to enforce rights and obligations under EU law is 
covered, e.g. by rights of access to documents to obtain proof or other relevant 
information. The facts of the case Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI) serve as an 
example,27 although its positive approach towards granting transparency in view of the 
Treaty’s demands have been sadly curtailed to a certain degree by more recent 
judgements by the Court in Bavarian Lager and Scheke.28 Also the proposals for reform of 
the basic legislation in this matter – regulation 1049/2001 do not appear to favour 
transparency and strive to achieve the international standard of the Aarhus convention 
but instead are designed to limit access to documents in the interest of administrative 
simplification.29 
 
B Review against implementing acts of Member States 
 
Where it comes to Member State action, rights under European law must, under the case 
law of the CJEU be accompanied by a corresponding remedy. The ‘form and extent’ of 
such remedy as well as the procedural rules to make it operational are, however, in 
principle within national competence,30 except for matters where the Treaties have 
explicitly granted jurisdiction to the CJEU.  
 
Under the case law of the CJEU, the obligation of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) 
obliges Member States to offer remedies subject to the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness. Under the principle of equivalence, in absence of applicable EU law, 
                                                 
26 Case C-15/98 and C-105/99 Italy and Sardegna v Commission [2000] ECR I-8855, para. 33 (emphasis added); Joined 
Cases T-254/00, T-270/00 and T-277/00 Hotel Cipriani and Italgas v Commission [2008] ECR II-3269, at paras. 77 and 78. 
See, however, Case T-9/98 Mitteldeutsche Erdoel-Raffinerie GmbH v Commission [2001] ECR II-3367, paras 78-85. 
27 Case T-2/03 Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI) v Commission [2005] ECR II-1121, especially paras 66-74. 
28 C 28/08 P Commission v Bavarian Lager [2010] ECR I-6055; Joined Cases C-92 and 93/09 Schecke [2010] ECR I-11063. 
29 See Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ 2001 L 145/43 and Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, OJ 2006 L 264/13. This measure brings to force within 
the Community obligations from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the 
Aarhus Convention). 
30 This is sometimes referred to as the principle of national procedural autonomy. It would appear that under the 
principle of sincere cooperation Member States are under the obligation to provide for procedural provisions to 
enforce EU law and in doing so have enjoy a margin of discretion – the limits of which also circumscribe the degree of 
the national procedural autonomy. For further debate and analysis see e.g. D-U. Galetta, Procedural Autonomy of EU 
Member States: Paradise Lost?, Springer (Heidelberg 2010) with further references.  
Member States must grant at least equivalent protection for violation of EU law to that 
available against violation of national law.31 A rule must ‘be applied without distinction, 
whether the infringement alleged is of Community law or national law’32 and Member 
States are prohibited ‘under the principle of equivalence to offer conditions less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions.’33 This applies to procedure 
including situations and possibilities of class action as well as substantive law. The 
similarity of a situation is subject to detailed case-by-case analysis, the Court looking at 
the purpose and effect of a national measure in question and exists ‘where the purpose 
and cause of action are similar’,34 or where the case concerns ‘the same kind of charges or 
dues.’35  
 
Although initially, the case law of the Court of Justice claimed that the right to an 
effective judicial review ‘was not intended to create new remedies’,36 the concept has 
rapidly evolved under the application of the principle of effectiveness. Under the 
Factortame-formula, the right to an effective remedy offers protection against ‘any 
provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice 
which might impair the effectiveness’ of Union law.37 That means that Member States 
should also ‘not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law’.38 Thus, national Courts are required to offer active 
protection of rights arising from Union law and are obliged to ‘guarantee real and 
effective judicial protection’39 even in cases such as Factortame where there was no 
equivalent form of protection of rights under national law. Anything which ‘might 
prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect’ is 
therefore incompatible with Union law.40 
 
                                                 
31 C 205-15/82 Deutsche Milchkontor [1983] ECR 2633, para 17; C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6297 para 29 
32 Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I-4951, para 36; Joined Cases 66/79, 127/79 and 128/79 Salumi [1980] ECR 1237, 
para 21. 
33 Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, para 27; C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6297 para 29. 
34 Case C-326/96 Levez [1998] ECR I-7835, para 41. 
35 Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I-4951, para 36; Joined Cases 66/79, 127/79 and 128/79 Salumi [1980] ECR 1237, 
para 21. 
36 Case 158/80 Rewe II [1981] ECR 1805, summary para 6. 
37 Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paras. 19, 20 
38 See e.g. Case C-128/93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I-4583, para. 37; Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, para 27; 
C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6297 para 29; Case C-78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, para. 39; Case C-
187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I-2741, para. 57; Case C-30/02 Recheio-Cash & Carry [2004] ECR I-6051, paras. 17, 18; 
Case C-212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I-6057, para. 95; Joined Cases C-231/06 to C-233/06 Jonkman and Others 
[2007] ECR I-5149, para. 28. 
39 Case 14/83 Van Colson [1984] ECR 1891, para 23. 
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Consequently, the Court has in several high-level cases held that Member States and their 
courts are under the obligation to create additional remedies to those already existent 
under national procedural rules, if such were necessary to ensure the relation between 
right and remedy under EU law. Examples are UPA,41 regarding the protection of 
individuals against regulations which for their effect do not require any further 
implementing measures; Borelli,42 regarding the protection of individuals in composite 
procedures with input from Union and Member State administrations into a final 
administrative decision; and Factortame,43 regarding the establishment of a system of 
interim relief to effectively protect a right under EU law.  
 
Compliance with the right to an effective remedy then depends both on whether the 
Member State offers procedural rules granting fair possibilities of bringing a case and that 
admissibility criteria allow actual access to a court. It also depends on whether success on 
the grounds of the claim of violation of a right under EU law would lead to a remedy 
which is capable of addressing the violation of the right.44 Since Peterbroeck and Van 
Schijndel these criteria have been combined to one standard formulation. There under the 
right to an effective judicial remedy requires that national judicial provisions may not 
render the application of Union law ‘impossible or excessively difficult’.45 Whether that is 
the case must be analysed in an overall view 
‘by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its 
special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the 
light of that analysis the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as 
protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the 
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proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into 
consideration.’46 
 
The consequences of such analysis are best portrayed in the situations so far established 
by the Courts covering both procedural remedies in the sense of individual rights of 
access to a court as well as the possibility of an individual obtaining a substantive remedy, 
if winning a case on the merits.47 Such rights exist in disputes in which individuals claim 
that rights arising from EU law have been violated by public authorities either of the EU 
or the Member States. They may also arise in disputes between individuals where the 
right to an effective judicial remedy has been used to develop anti-discrimination claims. 
 
Amongst the practically most important substantive remedies capable of effectively 
enforcing rights under EU law are obligations of Member States to make good damages 
which have arisen from their non-compliance with Union law. Such non-compliance can 
result from violation of primary law obligations which have direct effect, as well as for 
violation of secondary law obligations. In its landmark case Francovich,48 the Court of 
Justice held that a Member State may be liable to pay damages in the case of faulty 
transposition of a directive if there are no possibilities of using the remedy of 
exceptionally granting the directive direct effect. Despite the fact that the claim for 
damages arises from EU law,49 the procedures for obtaining damages are subject to 
national law, which under the principle of equivalence, may not provide for procedures 
for obtaining reparation ‘less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims’.50 
Under Brasserie du Pêcheur the same may be applicable to violations of EU law by Member 
States of primary law provisions.51 Liability of the Member States was famously expanded 
in Köbler 52 and Traghetti 53 to make good damages due to violation of EU law by any of its 
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authorities including the judiciary.54 National legislation limiting the liability of courts in 
these circumstances may be in violation of EU law because of the potential violation to 
the right to an effective remedy.55  
 
C Judicial remedies in disputes between individuals 
 
The right to an effective judicial remedy before is not limited to disputes between 
individuals and Member States or EU institutions and bodies. It is also applicable in view 
of the protection of rights arising from EU law in ‘horizontal’ disputes between 
individuals.56 Cases which have confirmed this indirect horizontal effect of the right to an 
effective judicial remedy have so far been decided by the Court especially with respect to 
rights arising from EU legislative acts – both in the form of directives or regulations. 
Especially productive has been the policy area of non-discrimination, consumer 
protection and health and safety provisions. 
 
Amongst the leading cases in this field are Van Colson57 and Dekker.58 There the Court 
established that a Member State implementing a directive on equality between sexes 
should do so in a way granting sanctions for violation of such rights which would 
dissuade violation and should guarantee real and effective judicial protection inter alia by 
having ‘a real deterrent effect’ on a person violating the objectives of the directive.59 In 
absence of a specific provision in the directive, the Member States were free to establish 
whichever sanctions regime – public or private, administrative or criminal – would be 
adequate. The Court held that where a Union regulation does not specifically provide any 
penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions, what is now Article 4(3) TEU,  
‘requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the 
application and effectiveness of Community law. For that purpose, while the 
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choice of penalties remains within their discretion, the Member States must 
ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalised under 
conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those 
applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance 
and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.’60 
 
When the Member State so does, it acts in the ‘scope’ of EU law and thus is obliged to 
comply with general principles of EU law and its Fundamental Rights.61 National courts, 
in fact all public bodies of Member States, are thus obliged to dis-apply Member State 
law which would jeopardise or make ineffective a right arising from EU law. In Fuss v 
Stadt Halle,62 for example, the Court of Justice held that the right to an effective judicial 
review were violated, if a national Court would not sanction a reprisal measure which 
‘might deter workers who considered themselves the victims of a measure taken by their 
employer from pursuing their claims by judicial process, and would consequently be 
liable seriously to jeopardise implementation of the aim pursued by the directive.’63  
 
Also questions of jurisdiction of national courts in civil disputes will be assessed in view 
of the right to an effective judicial remedy.64 In that context, Member States tribunals are 
specifically under the obligation to avoid situations of denial of justice in cases of rights 
under EU law.65 As a consequence, national judges in on-going procedures may be 
obliged to raise issues of EU law on their own motion (ex officio). This may be necessary 
to ensure that a remedy before a national tribunal for breach of EU law is actually 
effective. It is most frequently but not exclusively a question arising in disputes between 
individuals. Under the principle of equivalence, a Member State court will be obliged to 
apply EU law by its own motion, if it would be obliged to do so also with regard to 
national provisions.66 Whether the conditions of equivalence exist is assessed on a case 
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by case basis67 and ‘must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the 
procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various 
national instances.’68 Where a national court is bound by the pleadings of the parties as to 
the type of relief and the remedies, but not as to the law applicable to the case, it might 
therefore be obliged to apply EU law on its own motion.69 In that regard, the Court 
since Cofidis,70 in cases on the implementation of EU consumer protection directives, 
ruled that a national rule which in effect prohibits the national court to raise points of 
EU law renders the ‘application of the protection intended to be conferred on them by 
the Directive excessively difficult.’71 It follows, the Court states, that even in absence of 
specific pleadings by the consumer, ‘effective protection of the consumer may be 
attained only if the national court acknowledges that it has power to evaluate terms of 
this kind of its own motion.’72 This obligation may further exist, where a national court 
reviews the enforceability of an arbitration award made in the context of a consumer 
contract.73 Similarly, in Peterbroeck,74 a tax case with a complex set of national procedural 
rules, the CJEU held that the General Principle of the right to an effective judicial 
remedy may require a national court to ex officio raise an issue under EU law.  
 
Concerning the right to judicial remedies, the European Commission has, pressured by 
the European Parliament, in 2011 launched public consultations on introducing an ‘EU 
framework for collective redress.’75 
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Limitations to the right to effective remedy  
 
Regarding possible limitations of the right to an effective judicial protection, the CJEU 
has held that it is not a disproportionate limitation if a Member Stats by its procedural 
order introduces additional steps to access to the Courts. Such legitimate steps include, 
for example, ‘making the admissibility of legal proceedings concerning electronic 
communications services conditional upon the implementation of a mandatory attempt 
at settlement.’76 An instructive example of possible limitations is the Evans case.77 In that 
case, the UK had implemented a directive on compensation of victims’ damage or injury 
caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles in traffic accidents by delegating 
the assessment of damages to an agency against which appeal to an independent 
arbitrator was possible and whose award was subject, on limited grounds only, to review 
a national Court. The Court of Justice was satisfied that those arrangements did not 
‘render it practically impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to 
compensation.’78  
 
Law enforcement requirements can lead to a limitation of rights to an effective judicial 
remedy if proportionate. For example, regarding national leniency programmes which are 
intended to foster the enforcement of EU competition law under Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, the Court has held in Pfleiderer that Member States are obliged to ‘ensure that the 
rules which they establish or apply do not jeopardise the effective application’ of Union 
law.79 This includes granting a right to an effective judicial remedy for individuals – 
possibly through class action suits - facing violation of competition law to their 
disadvantage. In that case, a complex balancing of interests of effective public versus 
private enforcement of the Treaty articles was necessary. Balancing these competing 
requirements is an exercise to be undertaken by Member State legal systems taking into 
account the right to disclosure of the information, on one hand, and the right to 
protection of business information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency, on 
the other.80 
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A further limitation of the right to an effective judicial remedy has been recognised in the 
context of competition law. The Court of justice has acknowledged that the right of 
access to a tribunal can be misused by dominant market participants as strategy to harass 
competitors. A limitation of such harassment might not only be an option but an 
obligation in order to enforce the prohibition of misuse of a dominant position under 
Article 102 TFEU. The GC in Promedia held that, since the right to an effective judicial 
remedy was a fundamental right, ‘it is only in wholly exceptional circumstances that the 
fact that legal proceedings are brought is capable of constituting an abuse of a dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 86 [now Article 102] of the Treaty.’81 
 
Outlook on some problems of effective judicial protection in today’s EU 
 
Over the past six decades of development of the Union, the right to an effective judicial 
remedy has been continuously adapted to the Union’s changing constitutional basis and 
evolving modes of implementation of EU law. Amongst the most significant changes has 
been the development of a multi-jurisdictional, de-central yet procedurally highly 
integrated administration. Institutionally, the EU has developed a large amount of 
agencies which are organisationally separate from Member States administration but 
procedurally linked to them. This development is in organisational and procedural law 
terms what one more casually could call the intense ‘Europeanisation’ of many policy 
areas. 
 
So far rarely addressed, is also the question of how to ensure effective judicial remedies 
in multi-jurisdictional situations. The case law of the CJEU on this matter essentially 
addresses situations in which next to the Union legal order, one Member State is 
involved. In reality, however, the implementation procedures in an increasing amount of 
policy areas involve actors from several jurisdictions, both national and European.82 It is 
not always evident how to identify one or several jurisdictions which might have the 
competence to grant effective judicial review of acts adopted on the basis of such 
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‘composite’ procedures.83 Input into a final decision may result from various jurisdictions 
each applying their national law. Review of decisions taken by these means by the Court 
of the jurisdiction which adopted the final measure might not be able to do justice to the 
requirements of effective judicial review of the preparatory acts from other jurisdictions. 
There is, thus, in these areas a potential mis-match between procedural integration of de-
centrally organised administrations, on one hand, and a clear separation of judicial 
competencies, on the other. Where thus gaps may arise between dispersed decision-
making powers and judicial review, such gaps would be detrimental to the application of 
the right to an effective judicial remedy.    
 
An example of the many open and difficult questions in the context of multi-
jurisdictional and composite EU administrative procedures is the question damages 
arising from information sharing and joint computer based information systems such as 
e.g. the RASFF food safety information network.84 The fact that information is placed in 
the network might have adverse and damaging effect to a range of individuals such as 
producers of goods or consumers. There is no satisfactory solution under the current 
legal system for these issues. Legal uncertainty as to the applicable law, the competent 
courts and the possible remedies, however is detrimental to the enforcement of EU law 
in national (and EU-level) courts. Exploring procedural options such as allowing for 
forms of collective action might offer possible avenues to ensure that legal uncertainty 
does not deter from enforcement of legitimate interests. I am sure that many other areas 
of the fast developing and evolutionary area of EU administrative law are especially rich 
sources of questions for which creative thinking as to procedural and substantive 
remedies is necessary in order to comply with the EU principle of the right to an 
effective judicial remedy. 
 
In this context, rarely discussed is also the rising influence of the Ombudsman system 
under Article 197 TFEU which can grant cost-effective and timely relief in the form 
increased compliance with EU law by EU institutions, bodies and agencies. Similar 
institutions exist within most Member States. Ombudspersons offices are linked by a 
European network designed to refer cases to each other in order to ensure that the 
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relevant control institution takes care of a case. Despite lacunae in the cooperation 
mechanisms, by and large there a certain cooperation in the interest of individuals 
seeking redress against problematic non-compliance has developed. From the point of 
view of available remedies the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the 
national counterparts of this office as well as the joint supervisory bodies for various EU 
agencies are more powerful. The EDPS exercises investigatory and controlling, advisory 
and cooperative functions and has certain quasi-legislative and binding decision-making 
powers with the task of ensuring that Union institutions and bodies comply with their 
obligations as formulated in the EU’s data protection regulation.85 Although the power to 
conduct investigations is broadly comparable with that of the Ombudsman, going 
beyond this, the EDPS’s controlling powers give powers to oblige institutions to act in a 
certain way, grant powers to allow exemptions from certain data-processing prohibitions. 
This is backed-up by powers to impose sanctions upon any official or other servant for 
failure to comply with any obligations emerging from the EU’s data protection 
regulation. 
 
These developments, show that the concept of not only ex post judicial review is gaining 
ground, but also alternative forms of ongoing control and sanctioning for misconduct by 
administrations are being developed which might in certain situations prove more 
effective than subsequent control. Additionally, on the level of subsequent judicial 
review, there is room for allowing for forms of collective redress taking the financial 
pressure and the burden of time and effort off individuals to enforce rights arising from 
EU law. Generally speaking, however, the discussion of remedies in the EU looked at 
from the point of view of the right to an effective judicial remedy needs to take the 
complexity of a de-central and multi-jurisdictional enforcement system into account. 
Member States have the prime responsibility but also considerable room from creativity 
to comply with this specific procedural general principle of EU law. It is also the 
procedural codes of the Member States, which, although generally autonomously set, 
with regard to the enforcement of rights under EU law have to comply with the 
requirements of the EU’s right to an effective judicial remedy. 
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